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WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 The dispute in this appeal is a narrow one, centering on 
the interpretation of a forum selection clause that provides: 
“exclusive jurisdiction . . . shall lie in the appropriate courts of 
the State [of] New Jersey.”  Plaintiff argues that this language 
constitutes a waiver of the right to remove the pending litigation 
to the federal district courts in New Jersey.  Defendant responds 
that the clause contemplates jurisdiction in either the state or the 
federal courts located in New Jersey.  The District Court agreed 
with plaintiff and remanded the matter to the Superior Court of 
New Jersey.  We will affirm. 
 Plaintiff, a division within New Jersey’s Department of 
Treasury,1 purchased $300 million in preferred stock issued by 
defendant Merrill Lynch2 in January 2008.  Some months later, 
Merrill Lynch asked New Jersey to convert its preferred shares 
to common stock.  New Jersey agreed, so long as the terms of 
the conversion were as favorable as the terms governing the 
exchange of other stockholders’ preferred shares.  Merrill 
Lynch acceded to that demand, which was memorialized in the 
parties’ Share Exchange Agreement (“Agreement”), in July 
2008. 
 Approximately one year later, the State commenced this 
action in the Superior Court of New Jersey, alleging that Merrill 
                                                 
1  For simplicity’s sake, we refer to plaintiff as “New Jersey” or 
“the State.” 
 
2  Defendant Bank of America Corp. merged with Merrill Lynch 
in January 2009 and is bound to the terms of the agreements at 
issue.  Accordingly, we refer to defendants as “Merrill Lynch.” 
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Lynch breached the Agreement by converting another 
shareholder’s preferred stock in terms more favorable than 
those granted to the State.  New Jersey also alleged that 
financial disclosures produced by Merrill Lynch prior to the 
conversion had been incomplete or misleading. 
 Merrill Lynch removed the action to the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey, citing the “strong 
federal interest” in the case and asserting that issues under the 
Securities Exchange Act were embedded in the complaint.  
New Jersey moved to remand, arguing, inter alia, that the 
Agreement’s forum selection clause mandated that all disputes 
be resolved in New Jersey’s state courts. 
 Merrill Lynch responded that the forum selection clause 
required only that the matter proceed in a court located in the 
State of New Jersey.  The District Court disagreed, noting that 
every Court of Appeals confronted with a similar forum 
selection clause “ha[d] ruled that the reference to courts of the 
state . . . limits jurisdiction to state rather than federal 
tribunals.”3  It reasoned that such interpretation was consistent 
with the plain and ordinary meaning of the contractual language. 
                                                 
3  Citing Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue 
Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308 (2005), Merrill 
Lynch also argued that federal jurisdiction was proper because 
the complaint’s implication of federal securities statutes would 
require the court to interpret federal law to resolve the matter.  
The District Court found this argument “extremely dubious” but 
ultimately did not reach the issue.   
 Merrill Lynch made, at most, a vague reference to this 
contention in a footnote in its principal brief on appeal, though it 
devoted several pages to the argument in its reply.  Failure to set 
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 Accordingly, the District Court remanded the case to the 
New Jersey Superior Court.  
 Generally, this Court has no jurisdiction over appeals 
from orders remanding a matter to state court.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1447(d).  We have, however, recognized an exception where 
the remand is based on reasons not specified in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1447(c).  See Foster v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., Ltd., 933 F.2d 
1207, 1211 (3d Cir. 1991) (“§ 1447(d) does not bar review of 
the order of the district court remanding this case [based upon 
forum selection clause] . . . and that order is considered ‘final’ 
so as to vest this court with jurisdiction to hear this appeal”).4 
 Because the issue at hand is one of contractual 
construction, our standard of review is plenary.  See id. at 1216 
(citing cases). 
 “[A] defendant can contractually waive his right to 
remove . . . an action brought . . . in a state court.”  14B Charles 
Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper & Joan E. 
Steinman, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3721, at 97 (4th ed. 
2009).  Such waivers are usually upheld if they are reasonable 
                                                                                                             
forth an issue on appeal and present arguments in support of 
that issue in one’s opening brief generally amounts to 
“abandon[ment] and waive[r of] that issue . . . and it need not 
be addressed by the court of appeals.”  Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 
F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
4
  Other Courts of Appeals have held similarly.  See, e.g., Regis 
Assocs. v. Rank Hotels (Mgmt.) Ltd., 894 F.2d 193, 194-95 
(6th Cir. 1990); Karl Koch Erecting Co. v. New York 
Convention Ctr. Dev. Corp., 838 F.2d 656, 658-59 (2d Cir. 
1988). 
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and voluntary and if their enforcement is not inconsistent with 
public policy.  See id. at 97-98; Foster, 933 F.2d at 1219 (forum 
selection clause unreasonable where party makes “strong 
showing” that inconvenience of designated forum will effectively 
deprive him of day in court or that clause resulted from fraud or 
duress). 
 The parties in this case, sophisticated organizations both, 
were represented by counsel during the negotiation and 
adoption of the forum selection clause at issue.5  Merrill 
Lynch’s draft agreement proposed that the contract be 
construed under New York law and “that any suit, action or 
proceeding . . . arising out of . . . this Agreement . . . may only 
be brought in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York or any New York State court sitting in . . . 
 Manhattan.” 
 With certain exceptions not relevant here, the State 
agreed that New York law would govern the agreement.  On the 
other hand, it objected to Merrill Lynch’s choice of forum and 
suggested the following provision instead: “In connection with 
any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of . . . [this 
Agreement], each of the parties hereto agrees . . . that exclusive 
jurisdiction and venue shall lie in the appropriate courts of the 
State [of] New Jersey.”  Merrill Lynch incorporated the State’s 
                                                 
5  This negotiation took place prior to New Jersey’s January 
2008 purchase of Merrill Lynch preferred stock, and the 
resulting forum selection clause was memorialized in the 
agreement governing that purchase.  The forum selection 
provision in the Share Exchange Agreement, from which the 
current dispute arose, is identical to the clause agreed on by the 
parties in January 2008. 
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proposed forum selection language verbatim into the final 
Agreement.   
 In determining whether parties have contractually waived 
the right to remove to federal court, a court should “simply . . . 
us[e] the same benchmarks of construction and, if applicable, 
interpretation as it employs in resolving all preliminary 
contractual questions.”  Foster, 933 F.2d at 1217 n.15.  
Although some courts have required that waivers of removal 
rights be “clear and unequivocal,” they have done so in the 
context of non-contractual, litigation-based waivers or have 
relied upon such cases.  See id. (citing cases).  We recognized 
in Foster a distinction between those cases and the one then 
before us and concluded that a “clear and unequivocal” 
standard “serv[ed] no meritorious policy of litigation” and was 
“so stringent as to be contrary to the right of parties to contract 
in advance regarding where they will litigate.”  Id.  Accordingly, 
we look to the “plain and ordinary meaning” of the forum 
selection clause to determine whether it amounted to a waiver of 
the right to remove.  See Buono Sales, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors 
Corp., 449 F.2d 715, 721 (3d Cir. 1971) (“the wording of a 
contract is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning”). 
 As it did in the District Court, Merrill Lynch argues that 
the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase “appropriate 
courts of the State [of] New Jersey” includes both state and 
federal courts in New Jersey, for two reasons.  First, the 
reference to “courts” in the plural sense, in light of New 
Jersey’s unified Superior Court, must include the federal courts 
located in that state.  Second, the word “of” denotes the 
geographic location of the “appropriate courts,” rather than the 
governmental entity from which they derive their authority. 
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 We do not agree.  As the District Court noted, the New 
Jersey Superior Court may be a unified “court,” but it boasts 
fifteen vicinages throughout the twenty-one counties at the trial 
level.  The use of the plural “courts” is best read as a vestigial 
reference to the many tribunals comprising the Superior Court 
of New Jersey, not the federal district courts in the state.   
 This is particularly true when the small but significant 
word following “courts” in the forum selection clause -- “of” -- 
is taken into account.  “Of” “indicat[es] a possessive 
relationship” or “such relationships as ruler and subject, [or] 
owner and property.”  Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary of 
the English Language 1565 (Unabr. ed. 1968).  “Of” also means 
“from as the place of birth, production, or distribution: having as 
its base of operation, point of initiation, or source of issuance or 
derivation.”  Id.  
 After examining the contrast between the meanings of 
“in” and “of” in forum selection clauses, the Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit adopted “the widely-accepted rule that . . 
. ‘in [a state]’ express[es] the parties’ intent as a matter of 
geography, permitting jurisdiction in both the state and federal 
courts of the named state.”  FindWhere Holdings, Inc. v. Sys. 
Env’t Optimization, LLC, 626 F.3d 752, 755 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(emphasis added).  On the other hand, “‘of [a state]’ connote[s] 
sovereignty, limiting jurisdiction . . . to the state courts of the 
named state.”   Id. (emphasis added).  The Fifth Circuit put it 
more pithily:  “Federal district courts may be in [a state], but 
they are not of [that state].”  Dixon v. TSE Int’l Inc., 330 F.3d 
396, 398 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). 
 Notwithstanding the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
contractual language, Merrill Lynch relies heavily on Jumara v. 
State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873 (3d Cir. 1995).  There, we 
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held that a forum selection clause that referred to a “court of 
record in the county” included either the state court or the 
federal court in the judicial district encompassing that county.  
55 F.3d at 881-82. 
 The forum selection clause in Jumara was part of an 
automobile insurance agreement requiring arbitration of 
disputes.  That clause incorporated, and its interpretation was 
driven by, Pennsylvania’s Uniform Arbitration Act, which, we 
had previously held, was not intended to provide exclusive 
jurisdiction to the Pennsylvania state courts.  See id. at 881; 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gammon, 838 F.2d 73, 76-77 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 Indeed, we had recognized that interpreting the statute in a way 
that denied parties access to federal courts “might well run afoul 
of the Supremacy Clause.”  Gammon, 838 F.2d at 77 n.7. 
 There is no such concern in this case.  The forum 
selection clause here does not rely upon the interpretation of 
any statute, state or federal; rather, it is the bargained-for result 
of the parties’ counseled negotiation.  Jumara is not at odds with 
the District Court’s ruling.  
 We further note, as did the District Court, that the vast 
majority of our sister circuits have held that forum selection 
clauses like the one at issue here required remand to the state 
court.  See, e.g., FindWhere Holdings, 626 F.3d at 754 
(“‘[j]urisdiction and venue of any dispute . . . shall lie 
exclusively in, or be transferred to, the courts of the State [sic] 
of Virginia, USA’”); Am. Soda, LLP v. U.S. Filter Wastewater 
Grp., Inc., 428 F.3d 921, 924 (10th Cir. 2005) (“‘the Courts of 
the State of Colorado shall be the exclusive forum . . .’”); 
Dixon, 330 F.3d at 397 (“‘[t]he Courts of Texas, U.S.A. shall 
have jurisdiction . . .’”); LFC Lessors, Inc. v. Pac. Sewer Maint. 
Corp., 739 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1984) (“‘the rights . . . of the 
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parties hereto [shall be] determined . . . in the courts[ ] of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts’”).6 
 The other cases on which Merrill Lynch relies are not 
binding on us and are unpersuasive in their reasoning.  In Regis 
Associates v. Rank Hotels (Management) Ltd., 894 F.2d 193 
(6th Cir. 1990), for example, the Court applied a “clear and 
unequivocal” standard in determining whether defendant had 
waived its right to removal.  894 F.2d at 195.  We have 
expressly rejected that stringent standard.7  Foster, 933 F.2d at 
1217 n.15. 
 Merrill Lynch also contends that, since the State drafted 
the forum selection clause, that provision’s ambiguous language 
must be construed against the State.  We do not agree that the 
                                                 
6  Cf. Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(per curiam) (holding that “‘exclusive jurisdiction for any claim . 
. . resides in the courts of Virginia’” limited jurisdiction to state 
courts, but declining to enforce clause, as to California residents 
only, for public policy reasons). 
 
7  Also distinguishable are Global Satellite Communication Co. v. 
Starmill U.K. Ltd., 378 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2004), and 
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Astraea Aviation Services, Inc., 111 
F.3d 1386 (8th Cir. 1997).  The forum selection language in 
Global Satellite differed significantly from the clause we are now 
confronted with.  378 F.3d at 1271 (parties had “‘agree[d] . . . 
to submit to the jurisdiction of Broward County, Florida’” not 
“courts of” that state or county).  And, while the clause in 
Northwest Airlines mirrored the one at issue here, the Court did 
not address whether remand was required, apparently because 
neither party raised the question.  111 F.3d at 1390-95. 
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clause is ambiguous for the reasons already stated.  Further, 
while contra proferentem may be the general rule, 
“[a]pplication of the rule may be . . . limited by the degree of 
sophistication of the contracting parties or the degree to which 
the contract was negotiated.”  11 Williston on Contracts § 
32:12, at 480-81 (4th ed. 1999).  See also Cummins, Inc. v. Atl. 
Mut. Ins. Co., 867 N.Y.S. 2d 81, 83 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) 
(doctrine of contra proferentem inapplicable where parties, both 
sophisticated entities, had equal bargaining power in drafting 
agreement). 
 In sum, we find that the forum selection clause 
memorializes the parties’ intention to litigate all contractual 
disputes in the state courts of New Jersey and thus was a waiver 
of the right to removal. 
 Accordingly, the remand order will be affirmed. 
 
 
